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The World Bank Clean Technology Fund:
Friend or Foe to the UNFCCC?
by Addie Haughey*

I

Introduction

n response to the Bali Action Plan’s calls for an expanded
international response to climate change, the World Bank
created a series of Climate Investment Funds (“CIFs”) to
provide “immediate financial resources” to respond to global climate challenge.1 Since the creation of the funds last year, more
than $6 billion has been pledged
to CIF programs by donor countries2 and the CIFs have quickly
become leaders in international
climate investment, at least in
terms dollar amount.3
The Clean Technology
Fund (“CTF”)4 is one of the
more advanced CIFs, and began
providing large-scale financial
resources for low-carbon technology projects in developing
countries in early 2009.5 This
article examines whether the
CTF is an instrument through
which donor countries can fulfill their international climate
change funding obligations
under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). First, background for
answering this question is provided. Then it is argued that inconsistencies between the CTF and the UNFCCC should prevent
CTF donations from fulfilling UNFCCC obligations.

compromise meant to acknowledge that industrialized nations in
the global north are the primary cause of anthropogenic climate
change, but that all nations have a role to play in the solution.10
One key difference in obligations is that wealthier, developed
nations are responsible for funding climate change initiatives
around the globe by providing “new and additional financial resources” for developing
countries.11 In order to facilitate
this funding responsibility, the
UNFCCC established the Global
Environment Facility (“GEF”)
as its official financial arm,
responsible for aiding countries
in meeting their obligations to
the Convention.12
The Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC went into effect in
2005.13 It is the first instrument
produced by the UNFCCC with
legally binding emission reduction targets and timetables.14 The
Protocol includes flexible market mechanisms giving parties
multiple paths through which to
meet their binding targets.15 One
such path is the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), 16
which allows investment in emission reducing projects in
developing countries to generate “carbon emission reductions”
(“CERs”) that can then be traded on the market to developed
countries for use in their compliance with Kyoto.17
The market for carbon emission reduction credit trading
grew exponentially in the two years after the Kyoto Protocol
came into effect, reaching an estimated $30 billion.18 There
are now at least fifty-eight carbon funds in the market,19 which
purchase carbon credits on behalf of countries and private entities that cannot meet their Kyoto obligations through emission
reductions alone.20

The World Bank’s
Clean Technology
Fund . . . works by
pooling donations from
industrialized countries
and investing those
funds in carbon emission
reducing projects in
developing countries.

Background
In response to the imminent threat of climate change, the
international community came together at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 to create a framework convention to combat climate
change.6 The objective of the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”7 The
UNFCCC was created to organize and coordinate efforts to fight
climate change as well as to build political will and accountability. The convention’s Conference of the Parties (“CoP”) is
the primary mechanism for the world to address climate issues
and solutions.8
The framework created by the convention obligates country parties to meet “common but differentiated” standards,9 a
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trading.22 The Bank’s involvement in the international climate
regime began with its prototype permit purchasing,23 and was
solidified when it was selected to serve as the trustee for the
UNFCCC’s financial arm, the Global Environment Facility.24
The World Bank is considered the “pre-eminent multilateral institution providing assistance to developing countries.”25
Established in 1945 after the Bretton Woods Conference,26 the
Bank has served as an intermediary between its powerful shareholders, wealthy developed nations, and developing countries. In
this role, the Bank provides financial assistance, technical assistance, risk guarantees, and policy advice to public and private
sector parties in developing countries.27 This history of development assistance serves as a backdrop to the Bank’s involvement
in climate change finance, focusing its efforts on development
goals that are linked to carbon emission reduction and the transition to low carbon economies.28

The Clean Technology Fund
The World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund is a Climate
Investment Fund that works by pooling donations from industrialized countries and investing those funds in carbon emission
reducing projects in developing countries.29 Through the CTF,
the Bank focuses its financial expertise on scaling-up30 proven
low carbon technologies by expanding them to full sector scale,
or at least demonstrating that the technologies could be expanded
to such a wide scale.31
The Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”), the Clean Technology
Fund’s governing body, is responsible for approving programs
and project pipelines, establishing project criteria, determining
what financing products will be available, and ensuring consistency between CTF practices and the UNFCCC.32 The Committee is comprised of eight representatives from donor countries
and eight from countries eligible to receive CTF financing.33
TFC representatives are selected by consultation with the parties
eligible to serve.34
The CTF is structured so that Multilateral Development
Banks (“MDBs”) work with partner countries to develop country-specific investment plans.35 These plans incorporate CTF
financed projects and programs36 into the county’s existing
climate change reduction strategies. Recipients of CTF funds
can be public or private, though private recipients must demonstrate their place within a broader public climate change plan.37
Once developed, projects are sent to the Trust Fund Committee
for approval, after which funds are transferred in the form of
grants, concessional loans, and guarantees.38 Projects are examined based on established standards, including greenhouse gas
(“GHG”) emission savings,39 demonstration potential,40 development impact,41 implementation potential,42 and additional
cost and risk premium.43

Analysis of the Clean Technology Fund
The founding document of the Clean Technology Fund
goes to great lengths to demonstrate consistency and collaboration with the UNFCCC,44 but that consistency does not extend
far beyond rhetorical principles. This is evidenced by significant
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criticisms of the CTF’s motives, the World Bank’s record on
climate change, the Bank’s “technology neutral” approach to
carbon emission, and more.45 Beneath the layers of policy disagreement, even the CTF founding document46 itself demonstrates at least three areas where the CTF is inconsistent with the
UNFCCC. First, circular language in the document absolves the
CTF of responsibility for ensuring “new and additional” funding
to its recipient countries. Second, measures put in place to ensure
equitable governance of the CTF do not achieve this purpose.
Finally, the so-called “sunset clause,” intended to prevent undermining of the UNFCCC process by the CTF, is drafted poorly,
with a major loophole that allows the CTF to avoid sunset.

New and Additional Financial Resources
Are Not Guaranteed by the CTF
Article 4 of the UNFCCC lays out the commitments of the
party countries, including paragraph 3, which requires “new
and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs
incurred by developing country parties in complying with their
obligations.”47 Similarly, the Clean Technology Fund founding
document uses the phrase “new and additional” in its principles.48 It is telling, however, that the document neglects to cite to
the provision of the UNFCCC in which that terminology originated, despite extensive citation to other UNFCCC provisions.
Undoubtedly, all donor countries consider their donations
“new and additional” and intend to report their CTF donations to
the UNFCCC as part of meeting their Article 4 commitments.49
The CTF, however, has absolved itself of responsibility for
ensuring that obligations are met by placing the responsibility
on the donor country, not the CTF, to “ensure that contributions
are new and additional resources supplementing existing [Official Development Aid] flows otherwise available for developing
countries.”50
Even if some of the $6 billion donated into the CIFs so far
is new and additional, money donated to the CTF is comingled
and combined with other sources of funding.51 This is problematic because the UNFCCC reporting process requires that countries demonstrate that their individual contributions to climate
change are new and additional.52 Under this system it will be
difficult for a country to demonstrate this,53 and equally difficult
for a UNFCCC body to determine whether funds are new and
additional if they are mixed with other funding sources from the
outset.
In the midst of confusion and disagreement over exactly
what is new and additional funding and where the responsibility
for it lies, it appears that the CTF has used its founding document to pass responsibility on to its donor countries. This creates
a conflict; the system makes it difficult to ensure that funds are
new and additional and demonstrates that the World Bank is
either not prepared or not willing to meet UNFCCC standards
for climate change financing.
The Bank still has the opportunity to tighten up this lose
provision by not just asking donor countries to ensure that funding is new and additional, but by requiring them to demonstrate
that it is. In addition, the CTF could include an analysis of
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whether or not funding is new and additional in their donation
acceptance process, and/or incorporate new and additional status
into the investment criteria for projects.54 This has potential to
be complicated administratively,55 but may be required if donor
countries are to report donations as “new and additional” to the
UNFCCC. The CTF has multiple opportunities to ensure that
“new and additional” funding is used, and it should do so.

Equitable Governance is Not Guaranteed
by the CTF
Under the current international climate regime, each party
has an equal vote in all UNFCCC decisions,56 ensuring that
developed countries cannot use their superior political and financial circumstances to overpower the developing countries of the
global south.57 In the context of financing, this was a battle hard
fought, and won, by developing countries to ensure their equal
say in the distribution of financial resources coming from the
global north.58 Unfortunately,
the CTF has demonstrated
inconsistencies with this principle since its creation.
The G8, an organization
that lacks representation and
input from developing nations,59
made the initial request to the
World Bank to establish the Climate Investment Funds.60 This
means that even if developing
countries have subsequently
been included, they were not
involved at the outset in determining what international body
should house and administer the
fund, the fund structure, or fund
goals and objectives.
In its attempt to have equal
representation of developing
countries, the CTF included
an equal number of donor and
recipient country members on
its governing board.61 It also
established decision-making by consensus, allowing an unsatisfied board member to block decisions entirely or to abstain.62
In reality, however, the CTF governance structure does not
involve developing countries in the decision-making process in
a meaningful way. The consequences of this are potentially dire
in terms of the legitimacy of CTF projects. The inconsistency
between the CTF’s governing body and the governance principles of the UNFCCC is twofold.
First, Membership on the Trust Fund Committee (“TFC”)
is acquired through a “consultation” with an undefined group
of stakeholders.63 The CTF founding document is loose in its
instructions on the selection of Trust Fund Committee membership and unclear as to how the consultation among those parties should work.64 A footnote says that the “selection of donor

country representatives is to be primarily guided by total contributions to the CTF,”65 which implies less of a “consultation” and
more of a selection process based on the highest dollar donation.
What is more disconcerting is that no such instructions are given
regarding the recipient country representation on the committee; the document simply instructs that a consultation will occur
among the interested countries.66 This leaves interested countries to wonder how to ensure fair representation—or any representation at all—on the Committee.
The first Trust Fund Committee membership selection process took place behind closed doors at a meeting in Washington, DC in October of 2008.67 The “recipient” countries that
will serve on the committee include Brazil, China, Egypt, India,
Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey.68 While these countries are
vital to solving climate change, they represent emerging economic superpowers that are unlikely to share the concerns of a
vast number of smaller, less developed recipient nations, which
may now have inadequate and
ineffective representation on the
CTF committee.
The Trust Fund Committee
is charged with decision making
authority regarding which programs and projects will receive
funding from the CTF.69 This
vital role should be given to a
body that equitably represents
all parties involved.70 The current system does not guarantee
fairness or equity in selection
for the Committee and is inconsistent with the UNFCCC’s
principles of equity.71
The World Bank should
clarify the founding document’s language that lays out
the involved parties and defines
“consultation.” Alternatively, the
Bank should give more power
to the “Partnership Forum,” a
body established to encourage
dialogue about the Climate Investment Funds among diverse
interested parties.72 The role of the forum could be increases
to something more like the UN’s Global Environment Facility
(“GEF”) Assembly, which has some decision-making power
over GEF activities.73 Involving more stakeholders in actual
decision-making, beyond the current Partnership Forum role of
“dialogue and consultation,”74 would create a model much more
in line with the principles of the UNFCCC.75
Second, the committee is given little, if any, real power. The
board of the World Bank maintains control over all actions of the
bank, potentially including actions of the CTF as well.76 In addition, the MDBs maintain implementing power over CTF projects
after the TFC approves them,77 and the CTF founding document
provides only weak language to ensure that consistency with the

It is vital that the UN find
ways to make sure that
even non-UN programs
that are working towards
climate change goals
meet the necessary
standards of quality and
integrity in all facets of
the their operations.
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UNFCCC is maintained outside the scope of Trust Fund Committee responsibilities.78
The Trust Fund Committee is affirmatively given some
power over the Multilateral Development Banks that administer CTF projects: it is charged
with “ensuring monitoring and
periodic independent evaluation of performance and financial accountability of MDBs.”79
The CTF document also, however, specifies that MDBs “rely
on their own policies and procedures in developing and managing activities the [CTF] funds will
finance,”80 including fiduciary
standards and environmental and
social safeguards.81 This structure
implies that projects voted on by
the Trust Fund Committee will be
passed down to MDB boards to
control.
The CTF should ensure separation between the CTF’s
Trust Fund Committee and the World Bank Board by making it
explicitly clear how the CTF’s decisions might, or might not, be
subject to oversight from the World Bank Board and the Boards
of the MDBs. This would bring the actual practices at the World
Bank into compliance with the CTF’s claims of Trust Fund Committee leadership.82 In addition, the CTF founding documents
should set firm guidelines for MDB administration of projects
and should require MDBs to incorporate UNFCCC principles
into their standards and into their reporting to the Trust Fund
Committee.

On its face, then, it appears to offer up the CTF’s fate to the
UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties, but this language is problematic. The World Bank will have strong motivation to ensure
that the UNFCCC negotiations leave room for the CTF to continue. This motivation comes
from the Bank’s pronounced
desire to be at the forefront of
climate change funding and
carbon finance. The Bank also
has a strong case to make—the
CTF has already demonstrated
interest from big league donors
to the tune of over $6 billion,89
a number no doubt envied by
other players in the climate
change field.90
The sunset clause loophole leaves room for the Bank
to use its clout to keep the CTF
alive.91 It is unclear that the
CoP will be able to take strong
enough action to counteract political pressures coming from the
Bank and donor countries, which may be fonder of the CTF than
more regulated UNFCCC climate funding mechanisms.92
Indeed there are strong arguments that the CTF loophole
should remain in place to allow the Fund to continue beyond the
current climate negotiations. Proponents argue that World Bank
involvement in long-term projects could create market stability because many climate change related investments occur on
longer timelines than the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol has
provided for thus far.93 The CTF could offer ongoing and guaranteed financial support for such projects. It is also predicted that
tens of billions more dollars will be needed to finance emission
reducing projects if the global community is going to successfully combat long-term climate change.94 It may be unwise to
remove any avenue for funding from the market until that target
amount of investment is reached.
These arguments, however, do not change the ineffectiveness of the sunset clause as a tool to insulate the UNFCCC negotiations and do not change the possibility that the term “interim”
was used only to make the CTF easier for doubters to swallow.
The sunset clause was a politically shrewd addition, couched as
a compromise, which required little concession from the Bank.
The sunset clause leaves a gap between what the World
Bank claims the CTF does—prevent the undermining of future
UNFCCC negotiations—and what is likely, or even probable, to
do in Copenhagen. Even if the UNFCCC negotiations result in
the end of the CTF, the World Bank will ultimately have gained
experience, capacity, and connections in climate change finance
that will allow it to continue operations (similar to the CTF or
otherwise) in the field. It is possible that the CTF itself will
sunset only to be replaced by a similar program under another
name. The World Bank has successfully placed itself at the forefront of climate change finance with little or no input from the
UNFCCC.

Steps must be taken in
good faith to address the
inconsistencies between
the Clean Technology
Fund and the UN
Framework Convention
on Climate Change.

The CTF Sunset Clause Does Not Effectively
Prevent Undermining of the UNFCCC Process
The World Bank calls the CTF an “interim measure” to
provide funding for climate change projects during the negotiations of the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.83 The Bank claims
that the CTF’s “sunset clause”84 is sufficient to limit it to this
temporary goal and prevent diversion from or preemption of
UNFCCC negotiations.85 However, diversion and preemption
are possible if the CTF operates as a parallel structure to already
existing UNFCCC mechanisms, and in so doing creates a channel for climate related financing to bypass existing mechanisms
and flow through the CTF instead.86 The idea of having a sunset for the Fund after its “interim” purpose has been served is a
logical way to prevent this potential problem. The language of
the actual sunset clause, however, lacks a guaranteed ending for
the fund. A built-in loophole allows the CTF to remain operational if UNFCCC negotiations so indicate, thus rendering the
clause ineffective and creating a strong incentive for heavy Bank
involvement in the UN negotiations.87
The sunset clause states that “if the outcome of the UNFCCC
negotiations so indicates, the Trust Fund Committee . . . may
take necessary steps to continue the operations of the CTF.”88
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Conclusion
Analyzing the Clean Technology Fund governance structure and founding documents provides a broader picture of the
international financing of climate change solutions. It is valuable to the extent that it provides new ideas and new models
for future finance structures, which will need to generate and
invest an unprecedented amount of funding in order to meet the
challenge that global climate change presents. Advocates may
be hesitant to endorse and foster non-UN programs, but as the
CTF demonstrates, major donors do not feel the same hesitation. As such, it is vital that the UN find ways to make sure that
even non-UN programs that are working towards climate change
goals meet the necessary standards of quality and integrity in all
facets of the their operations.
Steps must be taken in good faith to address the inconsistencies between the Clean Technology Fund and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Efforts can and should
come from both sides: the World Bank and the UNFCCC. The
World Bank must show that it can play nice when international
“soft law”95 conventions regulate its investment targets. The UN
must manage the reality that the CTF and CTF-like instruments
are here to stay and will have to be dealt with within the existing
framework.

Ultimately, the global goal is to slow climate change before
it causes permanent damage. Clean Technology Fund projects
will no doubt contribute to a global reduction in GHG emissions
and an increase in low carbon economies around the world, but
these benefits come at a cost. The world spoke with one voice
when it established the UNFCCC, and success in the battle to
slow climate change requires that the voice of the UNFCCC be
respected and maintained in the international community.
The UNFCCC secretariat continues to call for a “political
answer” to the scientific community’s increasing knowledge on
the threat of climate change,96 and it has been asserted that the
2009 Copenhagen negotiations may be the last chance for this
political answer. It is vital that the UNFCCC and those working for its success learn from the current state of climate change
finance. In Copenhagen, the CTF’s governance structure, financial success, and environmental effectiveness will each need to
be scrutinized and analyzed to learn more effective paths forward and for the UNFCCC and to generate the political will for
the Conference of the Parties to utilize the sunset clause freely
and based on results, without the undue influence of politics.
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